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InternatIonal legal Updates
North AmericA & the cAribbeAN
the U.S. SUpreme coUrt to  
reheAr Kiobel, threAteNiNg 
corporAte AccoUNtAbility  
for hUmAN rightS AbUSeS
on February 28, 2012, the supreme 
Court heard oral arguments in the case of 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum. the case 
involves three questions: whether corporate 
civil liability under the alien tort statute 
(ats) is a question of merits or of subject 
matter jurisdiction; whether corporations 
can be held accountable for tort liability 
for violations of the law of nations; and 
whether and under what circumstances the 
ats allows courts to recognize a cause of 
action for violations of the law of nations 
occurring outside the U.s. despite that 
the central focus of the case was ini-
tially whether a corporation has civil tort 
liability under the ats, the oral arguments 
indicate the Justices are instead focused on 
the extraterritoriality of the statute itself. 
the Court ultimately ordered Kiobel to be 
reheard on the question of extraterritoriality 
in the fall of 2012.
the ats, which was enacted in 1789, 
gave federal courts jurisdiction to hear 
lawsuits filed by non-U.s. citizens for 
torts committed in violation of the law of 
nations. Initially, it regulated diplomatic 
relations between states and addressed 
crimes with international consequences, 
such as piracy. Modern application of the 
ats in cases such as Filártiga v. Peña-
Irala (1980) and Doe v. Karadžic (2000) 
have expanded the ats to hold individuals 
accountable for egregious human rights 
violations, including genocide, torture, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity, but 
there has been a split in federal circuit 
courts over whether corporations can 
be held liable for these same crimes. due 
to their status as extraterritorial entities, 
corporations have escaped international 
legal bodies designed to deliver justice for 
grave breaches of human rights.
Kiobel is a class action suit against 
royal dutch shell petroleum Co. (royal 
dutch) and shell transport and trading Co. 
the plaintiffs aimed to hold the companies 
accountable for aiding and abetting armed 
forces in the alleged killing, torture, and 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of 
a group of nigerians in the ogonia region. 
the issue in Kiobel was whether U.s. fed-
eral common law or international law is 
the proper source of law for determining 
whether corporate liability attaches 
under the ats. Counsel for royal dutch, 
Kathleen sullivan, argued that the proper 
source is customary international law, 
which has not held corporations as entities 
liable for committing or aiding and abet-
ting human rights violations. though the 
ats involves civil liability, sullivan based 
this argument on the jurisdiction of inter-
national criminal courts.
on this issue, the second Circuit had 
previously held that corporate liability 
does not exist under the ats because 
corporate liability is not recognized as a 
“specific, universal, and obligatory” norm 
of customary international law. However, 
subsequent decisions by the d.C. Circuit 
in Doe v. Exxon, the seventh Circuit in 
Flomo v. Firestone, and the ninth Circuit 
in Sarei v. Rio Tinto explicitly rejected the 
second Circuit’s reasoning, finding that 
the courts do have jurisdiction under the 
ats in suits against corporations. Kiobel 
is the first such case to come before the 
supreme Court.
some proponents of the notion that 
courts do, in fact, have jurisdiction point 
to the supreme Court’s 2010 decision 
in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission. In that case, the supreme 
Court extended certain First amendment 
protections to corporate entities, thereby 
extending rights traditionally reserved for 
persons. since corporate entities enjoy 
some rights as persons, Kiobel stood to 
hold corporations responsible as persons 
where they commit or aid in crimes pun-
ishable under ats. If the supreme Court 
affirms the second Circuit’s holding in 
Kiobel, the ats will not be applicable to 
corporations for claims of civil liability, 
even for the most atrocious acts.
However, during the Kiobel oral argu-
ments before the supreme Court, the 
Justices did not focus solely on the issue 
of whether corporate persons are liable 
under the ats — much to the frustration 
of petitioner’s Counsel paul Hoffman — 
instead turning their attention to the impli-
cations of the extraterritoriality of the stat-
ute. throughout the argument, the Justices 
honed in on whether the ats allows U.s. 
courts to hear lawsuits for violations of 
international law on foreign soil at all, for 
natural or corporate persons. Justice alito 
was particularly skeptical, asking: “[w]hat 
business does a case like [Kiobel] have in 
the courts of the United states?” and further 
commented that finding liability in this case 
would only create international tension.”
after the arguments, the Court took 
the rarely used step of requesting that 
counsel brief a new question: whether the 
ats “allows courts to recognize a cause of 
action for violations of the law of nations 
occurring within the territory of a sover-
eign other than the United states.” now, 
not only corporate accountability under 
ats at risk, but the very fate of the ats 
itself. the ats has been a useful tool for 
protecting human rights, and without it, 
victims of grave human rights abuses may 
be left without legal recourse. Yet among 
the varying arguments about domestic law 
versus international customary law, only 
Justice Breyer brought up the question of 
human rights. as both a survivor of torture 
and the United nations special rapporteur 
on torture, Juan Mendez, noted in his 
remarks on the case that he “hope[s] that 
the supreme Court will uphold the promise 
of these laws, and fulfill the United states’ 
commitment to protect human rights, 
and not allow corporations to get away — 
literally — with torture.”
iNveStigAtive JUdge refUSeS to 
proSecUte dUvAlier for crimeS 
AgAiNSt hUmANity
during the 1970s and 1980s 
Jean-Claude duvalier, known as “Baby 
doc” ruled Haiti with repressive tactics 
that included forced disappearances, 
torture, and detention. In 1986, after 
being overthrown by a popular rebellion, 
duvalier fled Haiti along with an alleged 
$300 to $800 million Usd embezzled dur-
ing his presidency. after nearly twenty-five 
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years in exile and with no stated reason, 
Duvalier returned to Haiti on January 16, 
2011. Upon his return, the government of 
Haiti reopened cases against him involv-
ing financial misconduct and human rights 
abuses. Many saw this as an opportunity to 
prosecute Haiti’s most notorious dictator, 
but Haitian Judge Carves Jean dismissed 
the claims of grave human rights viola-
tions, saying that the statute of limitations 
on his crimes had run. In doing so, Judge 
Carves Jean ignored international law 
governing the application of the statute 
of limitations in alleged crimes against 
humanity by granting impunity to Duvalier, 
thereby denying his thousands of victims 
a chance at justice.
“Baby Doc” Duvalier succeeded his 
father, Francois ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier’s 
brutal regime in 1971. As “President for 
Life,” “Baby Doc” Duvalier assumed the 
role of head of state and commander- 
in-chief of Haitian security forces. 
According to a Human Rights Watch 
report, Duvalier “commanded the network 
of military and paramilitary organizations 
that committed a wide range of serious 
human rights violations, including arbi-
trary arrests, torture, ‘disappearances,’ and 
extra-judicial executions.” Additionally, 
his government held hundreds of political 
prisoners in prisons dubbed “the triangle 
of death” due to their infamous inhumane 
conditions and numerous prisoner deaths.
Despite the many years of documented 
evidence of abuse under Duvalier, inves-
tigative Judge Carves Jean recommended 
that Duvalier only face charges for a mis-
appropriation of government funds; a crime 
that, under Haitian law, carries a maximum 
penalty of five years in prison. According 
to Judge Carves Jean, the statute of limita-
tions had run on the alleged human rights 
abuses and thus Duvalier could not be 
prosecuted. The complainants, along with 
international organizations such as Human 
Rights Watch, said they would appeal the 
decision not to prosecute Duvalier for the 
crimes they suffered. Duvalier’s lawyer, 
Reynald Georges, reported that he would 
appeal the corruption charges.
Under Section 466 of the Haitian 
Code of Criminal Procedure (available 
here in French), the statute of limita-
tions for criminal charges is 10 years, 
which, according to Mr. Georges, would 
make Duvalier’s crime non-prosecutable. 
However, this requirement does not neces-
sarily apply to elevated and internationally 
regulated crimes such as torture or crimes 
against humanity, as Haiti is a party to the 
American Convention on Human Rights 
and has accepted as binding the juris-
diction of the Inter-American Court on 
Human Rights. The Inter-American Court 
has upheld Article 1 of the Convention 
on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity, which provides that 
“[n]o statutory limitation shall apply to 
[crimes against humanity], irrespective 
of the date of their commission.” While 
Haiti has not ratified that treaty itself, the 
Inter-American Court has further held that 
States under its jurisdiction must nonethe-
less comply with this imperative of the 
law, as “the non-applicability of statutes 
of limitations to crimes against humanity 
is a norm of General International Law 
(jus cogens), which is not created by said 
Convention, but is acknowledged by it.”
Moreover, the forced disappearances 
characteristic of the Duvalier regime are 
considered by international law standards 
legally “unfinished” crimes, as the fate of 
victims of forced disappearances is as yet 
unknown. Any statute of limitations that 
could run will not start until their fate is 
uncovered and the crimes are deemed “fin-
ished.” Until the fate is known, the obliga-
tion to investigate a disappearance persists. 
Human Rights groups, as well as the 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) have condemned 
the decision not to prosecute Duvalier 
for human rights abuses, and argue that 
Haiti is shirking its recognized obligations. 
Rupert Colville of OHCHR urged the 
authorities to bring justice to the victims of 
the Duvalier regime’s human rights abuses, 
concluding “there can be no true reconcili-
ation and forgiveness without justice.”
Anna Naimark, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers North America for the 
Human Rights Brief.
Latin america
Pinheirinho evictions highLight 
BraziLian Poor’s Lack of access to 
adequate housing
Six thousand people have been forcibly 
evicted from their homes in Pinheirinho, 
a community on the outskirts of Sao Jose 
dos Campos, in Sao Paulo State, Brazil. 
The Military Police Command orches-
trated the eviction in the early morning of 
Sunday, January 22, 2012 after municipal 
Judge Marcia Loureiro signed a reposses-
sion order despite Brazilian constitutional 
protections and ongoing negotiations with 
the federal government to incorporate 
Pinheirinho residents into the federal hous-
ing program, Minha Casa, Minha Vida 
(My House, My Life). The situation of the 
Pinheirinho residents highlights the plight 
of millions of poor Brazilians whose right 
to adequate housing is precarious at best.
The right to adequate housing is the 
right of every person to gain and sustain 
a safe and secure home and community 
in which to live in peace and dignity. It is 
enshrined in Article 25 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
Article 11 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), and Articles 21 and 22 of 
the American Convention on Human 
Rights (American Convention). Brazil is 
a state party to both the ICESCR and the 
American Convention. To help citizens 
realize rights in the ICESCR, govern-
ments are obliged to take steps toward 
the progressive realization of these rights, 
including legislative, administrative, and 
judicial measures with a focus on the con-
tinued improvement of living conditions. 
In order to fulfill its obligation, Brazil 
has enacted programs like Minha Casa, 
Minha Vida, and has passed a plethora of 
laws focused on housing. Most notably, 
several articles of Brazil’s Constitution 
specifically address the right to adequate 
housing: Article 6 lists the right to housing 
among those protected under the document 
and housing is also mentioned in Articles 
7(IV), 23(IX), 183, 187(VIII), 203(II). 
Article 183 states that “those who are 
squatters in an urban area of up to 250,000 
(m2), for a continuous period of at least 
five (5) years, without claim for housing, 
will be able to have its domain unless he/
she has another urban or rural property,” 
assuming the property upon which they are 
squatting is not being otherwise utilized. 
The Pinheirinho settlement sprung up in 
2004 and therefore meets the criteria laid 
out in Article 183. During the past eight 
years, the residents have built churches and 
libraries, and have opened shops and cafes. 
They have also been working to legalize 
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their right to occupy the property through 
Sao Paulo State’s Cidade Legal (Legal 
City) settlement regularization program.
Pinheirinho sits on previously unim-
proved land owned by a bankrupt invest-
ment firm. The head of the investment 
firm, Naji Nahas, owes a debt of $15 mil-
lion in back taxes to Sao Jose dos Campos, 
which the municipality wished to collect 
by repossessing his parcel of land. Brazil’s 
federal and state courts have been bat-
tling about who has jurisdiction over the 
case, and whether the city could actually 
displace the residents. The federal govern-
ment was willing to buy and regularize the 
land, which prompted a federal judge to 
stay the impending eviction. Although the 
municipality of Sao Jose dos Campos and 
the government of Sao Paulo state refused 
the offer, they did agree to a negotiation 
window of fifteen days. This agreement 
was breached when the police arrived 
in Pinheirinho January 22, after another 
federal judge overturned the stay and 
declared the fate of Pinheirinho to be a 
state matter. The municipal court was 
then able to reinstate the original court 
order upholding the expropriation of the 
land. Despite resistance efforts in defense 
of their community, the residents of 
Pinheirinho have now been forced into 
emergency housing situations provided by 
local churches. Most have not been permit-
ted back to Pinheirinho to reclaim what 
is left of their possessions.
The plight of the Pinheirinho residents 
is unfortunately not uncommon in Brazil, 
as the number of evictions has grown 
along with the country’s economy. Brazil’s 
economic boom has led to public and 
private infrastructure and development 
projects in the country’s main cities and 
their suburbs, many in preparation for 
the upcoming World Cup and Olympic 
Games. However, tens of thousands of 
low-income families have been forcibly 
displaced in order to make way for these 
projects: according to 2011 government 
statistics, 11.5 million Brazilians live 
in inadequate and often illegal housing, 
compared with 4.5 million in 1991. 
Moreover, Brazil reports an estimated 
housing deficit of about 7 million units.
To date, it is unclear whether the state 
or local government actually had jurisdic-
tion over the Pinheirinho decision and 
what will ultimately become of the 6,000 
people who called the community home. 
However, Article 183 of Brazil’s consti-
tution, as well as its ratification of the 
ICESCR and the American Convention, 
require Brazil to address its housing cri-
sis to remedy situations like the one in 
Pinheirinho, and to ensure the progressive 
realization of all Brazilians to their right to 
adequate housing.
ArgentinA DecriminAlizes Abortion 
in cAses of rApe
In Argentina, the case of a 15-year 
old girl who was raped by her stepfather 
drew nationwide attention after she and 
her doctor were held criminally respon-
sible for terminating the resulting preg-
nancy. The central issue in the case was 
the interpretation of Article 86, paragraph 
2 of Argentina’s penal code, which out-
lawed abortion except where the preg-
nancy resulted from “rape or indecent 
assault perpetrated against a feeble-minded 
female.” Argentinian courts have disagreed 
over whether this part of the statute applies 
only to mentally handicapped women who 
lack the capacity to consent, or to cases of 
rape in general. In its opinion, the National 
Supreme Court clarified the confusion and 
confirmed the broader application of the 
statute to all cases of rape.
After the girl’s petition to have an 
abortion was initially denied by the lower 
court in her home province of Chubut, the 
provincial Supreme Court there ultimately 
granted her the necessary permission. 
However, the Public Defender of Chubut 
appealed the decision to the National 
Supreme Court on behalf of the girl’s fetus 
after the abortion had been performed. 
Citing Argentinian and international juris-
prudence, the Public Defender argued that 
the girl’s abortion was illegal because she 
is not mentally handicapped and because 
the fetus’ right to life had been violated.
The Supreme Court of the Nation sum-
marily rejected the Public Defender’s argu-
ments in its strongly worded opinion, 
stating that Article 86, paragraph 2 of the 
penal code should be interpreted to allow 
legal abortions in all cases of rape, not 
only situations where the survivor is men-
tally handicapped. The Court went on to 
explain that any other interpretation would 
substantially and unnecessarily increase 
the number of illegal abortions taking 
place in Argentina, and would have an 
unreasonable negative effect on rape sur-
vivors who are not mentally handicapped. 
“Forcing every other victim of a sexual 
crime to carry their pregnancy to term is 
an attack against their most fundamental 
rights,” concluded the Court, after also 
basing its arguments on Argentinian and 
international law.
Referencing Article 75, paragraph 23 
of the Constitution, which addresses con-
gressional duties with reference to human 
rights, especially the rights of children, 
women, the elderly, and the handicapped, 
the Court stated that protecting the rights 
of children should not be interpreted in a 
way that would hold rape survivors crimi-
nally responsible for terminating ensuing 
pregnancies. In this case, where the survi-
vor was herself a juvenile, the Argentinian 
state’s duty to protect her rights super-
seded its duty to the fetus. The Court went 
on to state that Argentina’s adherence to 
both the Organization of American States 
and United Nations human rights trea-
ties was not compromised by the Court’s 
move to decriminalize abortion in cases 
of rape. In fact, the Court considered the 
equal protection and non-discrimination 
clauses of the Argentinian Constitution, 
the American Convention on Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, to be the guiding principles of 
Argentinian jurisprudence. Provisions of 
the Inter-American Convention for the 
Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of 
Violence Against Women, the Convention 
on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child that 
address fundamental freedoms and equal 
protection under the law also apply.
Under the clarified interpretation of the 
Penal Code, doctors who perform abor-
tions after receiving sworn statements from 
women that the pregnancy they are seeking 
to terminate resulted from rape also cannot 
be held criminally responsible. As such, 
the Court noted its desire to streamline 
access to medical services for rape sur-
vivors to remedy cumbersome processes 
that could be considered structural and 
institutional inequality and violence under 
the Inter-American Convention for the 
Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication 
of Violence Against Women. In doing 
this, the Court also hopes to dissuade rape 
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survivors from seeking unsafe abortions, 
which could potentially result in severe 
health complications and possibly death. 
The World Health Organization estimated 
that twelve percent of maternal deaths in 
Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008 
were due to unsafe abortions. Likewise, 
about one million women per year are 
hospitalized in the region because of com-
plications from unsafe abortions.
While the Catholic Church and other 
pro-life organizations in Argentina have 
denounced the Supreme Court’s ruling, 
women’s rights activists have hailed it as a 
step in the right direction for reproductive 
freedom in Argentina. As evidence of this, 
several days after the Court issued its deci-
sion, the National Campaign for the Right 
to Legal Abortion rallied representatives 
from Argentina’s main political parties and 
proposed legislation which would decrimi-
nalize abortion during the first trimester of 
pregnancy, showing the issue will not end 
with the Supreme Court’s decision.
Christina Fetterhoff, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, covers Latin America for 
the Human Rights Brief.
Middle east and north africa
israel cuts ties with the unhrc
On March 26, 2012, Israel announced 
its intent to sever ties with the United 
Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) 
following the Council’s continued inves-
tigation into Israel’s settlements in the 
West Bank. The international legality of 
these settlements has been in question 
since Israel began building on land occu-
pied during the 1967 War. The Palestinian 
Authority, who claims the legal right to 
administer some of the land on which the 
settlements are built, moved in March for 
the UNHRC to investigate possible human 
rights violations that may ultimately result 
from Israeli operation of the settlements. 
According to UNHRC president Laura 
Dupuy Lasserre, the probe would enlist 
a panel of human rights experts to report 
back to the UNHRC concerning “the 
implications of the settlements on civil, 
political, economic, social, and cultural 
rights of the Palestinian people in the 
occupied Palestinian territory, including 
East Jerusalem.” The Israeli government, 
displeased with the result of the vote 
triggering the investigation, is now cutting 
all ties with the UNHRC including 
refusing to allow the UNHRC access to 
the settlements.
The UNHRC is an operating body 
within the United Nations, and comprised 
of forty-seven member states tasked by 
the General Assembly with strengthening 
the promotion and protection of human 
rights within the United Nations member 
community. It was established pursuant to 
Resolution 60/251 in April 2006, replacing 
the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights as the principal investigatory body 
for human rights situations requiring the 
United Nations’ attention.
The human rights obligations of UN 
member states can stem from either 
General Assembly resolutions or treaty 
responsibilities. Whereas bodies like the 
UN Committee Against Torture or the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child are 
charged with monitoring member state 
compliance with specific agreements and 
conventions, General Assembly resolutions 
are non-binding and carry no affirmative 
international obligations. As such, although 
international norms are a powerful interna-
tional relations tool in and of themselves, 
departures from these norms do not carry 
the full weight of consequences associated 
with violating international legal agree-
ments. This disparity can impact state deci-
sion-making, even though the obligations 
a given country has across both mediums 
may be substantially similar.
In the context of the UNHRC, Resolution 
60/251 emphasizes “the responsibilities of 
all States, in conformity with the Charter, 
to respect human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms for all,” but provides no 
other language empowering the Council to 
enforce these responsibilities. Instead, the 
duties of the UNHRC are described as “[p]
romoting human rights education,” “advi-
sory services,” and “mak[ing] recommen-
dations to the General Assembly.” By con-
trast, the Mandate of the UN Committee 
Against Torture — set forth in Part II of 
the UN Convention Against Torture Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment — provides for the use 
of discretion in investigating reports of 
systematic torture by a state, as well as 
the Committee’s ability to weigh evidence 
and solicit input from state parties before 
making its final report. There is thus a 
marked different in the stated role of the 
UNHRC compared to other operating bod-
ies. The latter can investigate matters with 
the weight of whatever treaty applies to the 
matter in question.
Given the lack of compulsory power in 
the UNHRC’s enabling resolution and the 
absence of a specific treaty setting forth 
its scope and mandate, it is likely that if 
Israel chooses to continue its refusal to 
cooperate with the UNHRC, there will be 
no substantive international legal conse-
quences. Participation in UNHRC activi-
ties, including the fact-finding missions 
Israel takes issue with, remains technically 
and practically voluntary. Despite being a 
permanent agenda item for the UNHRC, 
Security Council resolutions against Israel 
continue to be unrealistic given the United 
States’ ability to exercise its Permanent 
Five Security Council veto power over any 
proposed resolution, pursuant to Article 
27(3) of the UN Charter.
A common criticism of the UNHRC 
is that its members have themselves been 
subject to allegations of human rights 
violations in recent years, which further 
undermines the Council’s credibility as a 
genuine, committed guardian of human 
rights. The UNHRC current membership 
includes China, Saudi Arabia and Libya, 
all of whom have been widely suspected or 
outwardly accused of serious human rights 
violations in the recent past. Recent lists of 
candidates for membership have included 
Sudan and Syria. The UNHRC’s lack of 
actionable international legal authority to 
compel cooperation further cements the 
Council’s role as an information-gather-
ing device rather than an intermediate 
enforcement mechanism. It seems clear 
that Israel’s refusal to engage the Council 
on any level will frustrate the impact of 
any investigations or advisory services. 
Without the unilateral ability to make 
policy determinations, it will be up to 
diplomatic actors other than the UNHRC 
itself to bring Israel back to the table mov-
ing forward.
Kyle Bates, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, wrote this column for the Human 
Rights Brief.
have syrian opposition Groups 
violated the Geneva conventions?
On July 31, 2012, video footage 
surfaced on YouTube purporting to show 
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the summary execution of members of the 
pro-Syrian regime Berri clan by the Syrian 
opposition. While the events portrayed 
are difficult to verify, the video showed 
what many believe to be Zeino Berri, an 
alleged regime loyalist and shabiha leader 
(pro-regime thugs used by the regime 
to violently crackdown on dissent), and 
another clansmen being taken into a yard 
and lined up against a wall. Moments later, 
the sound of assault rifles erupts and the 
camera pans to a heap of bodies on the 
ground. According to activists, fourteen 
members of the clan were killed by shoot-
ing and hanging. While the Free Syrian 
Army (FSA) “strongly condemned” the 
executions, maintaining that it had no links 
to the group responsible for the act, the 
Tawheed Brigade, an Aleppo-based rebel 
group affiliated with the FSA, claimed 
responsibility for the executions, citing the 
Berri Tribe’s failure to uphold an earlier 
agreement to remain neutral during the 
conflict. Two weeks prior to the incident, 
the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) designated the fighting in 
Syria to be a non-international armed con-
flict (NIAC), officially subjecting combat-
ants to the Geneva Conventions. In light 
of the ICRC’s recent designation, the sum-
mary execution of members of the Berri 
clan by armed opposition groups consti-
tutes a violation of Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions, which requires 
that those not taking an active part in hos-
tilities, including members of the armed 
forces in detention, be treated humanely.
The conflict in Syria began in March 
2011 when demonstrators, inspired by 
other Arab Spring revolutions, began call-
ing for the resignation of President Bashar 
al-Assad and his regime. While protests 
were initially peaceful, the regime’s con-
tinued and increasing use of violence to 
suppress the revolution coupled with the 
international community’s inability to 
come to a diplomatic solution, inter alia, 
resulted in the increased militarization 
of the opposition movement. The FSA, 
formed in July 2011, serves as the primary 
armed opposition group and is comprised 
an estimated 40,000 military defectors and 
volunteers. Over the past several months, 
groups like Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch, while recognizing 
that Syrian government forces “perpetuate 
human rights violations on a mass scale, 
including crimes against humanity and war 
crimes,” have expressed concern over rebel 
violations of international law including 
unlawful killings and torture.
The Geneva Conventions — to which 
194 states are party — regulate con-
duct during armed conflict. While the 
Geneva Conventions generally concern 
international armed conflict, Common 
Article 3 and Additional Protocol II dic-
tate minimum requirements for belliger-
ents engaged in NIAC. Although Syria 
is not a party to the Additional Protocol, 
it is a party to the Geneva Conventions, 
including Common Article 3, which have 
become universally applicable. When des-
ignating hostilities as a NIAC, the ICRC, 
whose legal determinations are not bind-
ing but extremely authoritative, considers 
the intensity of the conflict (including its 
duration) and the level of organization of 
armed opposition groups. The ICRC previ-
ously designated the areas around Homs, 
Hama, and Idlib war zones, but in mid-
July, it designated Syria to be in a state of 
NIAC, suggesting that both the intensity 
of the violence and the organization of 
armed opposition groups throughout the 
country reached the level necessary for the 
designation. The ICRC interprets Common 
Article 3 as applying to both to state armed 
forces as well as organized armed groups. 
Thus, this designation officially subjected 
all combatants, including the regime’s 
Syrian Army, the opposition’s FSA as well 
as other “organized and armed opposi-
tion groups,” to the provisions outlined in 
Common Article 3.
Common Article 3 requires that persons 
not active in hostilities, including members 
of armed forces who are in detention, be 
treated humanely, and prohibits “murder 
of all kinds” and “the passing of sentences 
and carrying out of executions without pre-
vious judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court.” The summary execution 
of the fourteen Berri clan members is a 
clear violation of Common Article 3, and 
ultimately provides grounds for a later war 
crimes prosecution.
In a televised interview on August 1, 
an FSA spokesperson reiterated the FSA’s 
commitment to the Geneva Conventions 
and called for an investigation into the 
killings, the results of which Amnesty 
International says should be referred to 
the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria. 
According to Amnesty International, this 
referral would be “instrumental for pos-
sible prosecution” if the situation in Syria 
is referred to the ICC. While it is clear that 
the Syrian regime remains responsible for 
a majority of the war crimes committed 
during the conflict, the FSA should none-
theless demonstrate its commitment to the 
Geneva Conventions and prove that this is, 
as the group claims, an isolated incident 
by completing an “impartial, independent, 
and comprehensive” investigation into the 
killings.
Kaitlin Brush, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, wrote this column for the Human 
Rights Brief.
Sub-Saharan africa
The PracTice of riTual KillingS 
and human Sacrifice in africa
Despite the African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights’ that provides an indi-
vidual is entitled to respect for his life and 
integrity of his person, ritual killings and 
the practice of human sacrifice continue in 
several African countries. These practices 
entail the hunting down, mutilation, and 
murder of the most vulnerable people in 
society, including people with disabilities, 
women, and children. Reports indicate that 
killings of this nature occur in Nigeria, 
Uganda, Swaziland, Liberia, Botswana, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Namibia, and 
Zimbabwe. Because of the secrecy involved 
in ritual sacrifices, a majority of these inci-
dents go unreported and uninvestigated. 
Anti-sacrifice advocates face an uphill 
battle in combating these rituals because 
the practices are largely denied and touch 
on cultural underpinnings, resulting in an 
ideological conflict between protection of 
human rights and respect for the beliefs 
and practices of other cultures.
Those who practice sacrifice and ritual 
killings believe them to be acts of spiri-
tual fortification. Motivations to carry 
out these acts include the use of human 
body parts for medicinal purposes and 
the belief that human body parts possess 
supernatural powers that bring prosperity 
and protection. In Uganda, reports indicate 
that child sacrifice is a business where 
the wealthy pay witch doctors to conduct 
sacrifices in an effort to expand their for-
tunes. In Swaziland and Liberia, politicians 
allegedly commission ritual killings to 
improve their odds in elections. In parts of 
South Africa, ritual killings are culturally 
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accepted, and the practice is often not 
reported by community members.
Questions of cultural relativism may 
arise with respect to ritual killings because 
they may be linked with religious beliefs. 
Article 8 of the African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights guarantees freedom 
of conscience, the profession and free 
practice of religion. The article also states 
that “No one may, subject to law and 
order, be submitted to measures restricting 
the exercise of these freedoms.” While a 
broad reading of Article 8 guaranteeing 
the right to religious freedom could theo-
retically permit ritual killings for religious 
reasons, the “subject to law and order” 
clause may be invoked to limit the free 
practice of religion with respect to ritual 
killings. Furthermore, reading the Charter 
in its entirety supports a prohibition on 
ritual killings. For instance, Article 5 states 
that every individual shall be “entitled 
to respect for his life and the integrity of 
his person.” If ritual killings were permit-
ted as an acceptable exercise of religious 
freedom, the door is opened to many of 
potential human rights violations on the 
basis of religion.
In response to recent reports of ritual 
killings allegedly conducted by some tra-
ditional healers, other healers have spoken 
out against ritual killings, arguing that 
those practices are a disgrace to the his-
tory and culture of African medicine men 
and healers. In March 2012, Sierra Leone’s 
union of traditional healers met to put 
forward their campaign against ritual kill-
ings. Since the union’s founding in 2008, 
their mandate has always been to stop 
indiscriminate killings and afflictions of 
the innocent.
Activists rallying against ritual kill-
ings are calling for stronger protections, 
including legislation that would allow for 
the regulation of traditional healers. Some 
countries, such as Uganda, Rwanda, and 
Nigeria have taken steps to begin regulate 
traditional healers, but regulation is not 
widespread. Appropriately regulating tra-
ditional healers could provide necessary 
protection for individuals seeking care 
from traditional healers and could hold 
healers accountable for unlawful acts, such 
as ritual killings. Furthermore, regulation 
could provide protection for traditional 
healers, for example, with respect to intel-
lectual property rights.
As they have done for centuries, tradi-
tional healers continue to fulfill an impor-
tant role of providing beneficial medical 
services to communities. However, the 
practice of ritual killings and human sac-
rifice goes against the fundamental human 
rights norm of ensuring respect for an 
individual’s life and integrity of person. 
Although the African Charter guarantees 
the right to freely practice one’s religion, 
ritual killings are not permissible on this 
basis. The positive contributions of tra-
ditional healers to many African societ-
ies should not be compromised by the 
practice of ritual killings. Activists and 
governments can ensure respect for the 
human rights of all individuals by working 
to ensure transparency and accountability 
among traditional healers.
Saralyn Salisbury and Lindsay Roberts, 
J.D. candidates at the American University 
Washington College of Law, wrote this col-
umn for the Human Rights Brief.
EuropE
ThE ArrEsT And dEporTATion of 
suspEcTEd islAmic ExTrEmisTs in 
frAncE
Over a ten-day period in March 2012, 
Mohammed Merah, an Islamic extremist, 
shot and killed seven unarmed people in 
Toulouse, France. In the wake of these 
killings, the French government proceeded 
to arrest and detain nearly thirty sus-
pected Islamic terrorists. To date, two 
have been deported and French authorities 
have stated that others will follow. Unlike 
Norway’s judicial response to the Oslo 
shootings of July 2011, France has under-
taken a responsive plan of action that side-
steps the criminal justice system and relies 
instead on detentions and deportations.
Several of the detainees are part of the 
suspected terrorist organization, Forsane 
Alizza, which French authorities banned 
in February 2012. These individuals have 
been accused of “being part of a crimi-
nal gang connected to a terrorist enter-
prise” — a crime punishable by up to 
ten years imprisonment. State prosecutors 
have indicted others in the organization for 
allegedly plotting to kidnap a prominent 
Jewish judge from Lyons. Paris prosecutor 
Francois Molins explained that many of 
those arrested have undergone religious 
indoctrination and physical training in 
parks and forests near Paris “in order to 
take part in a jihad.” He also stated that 
several suspects operated websites call-
ing for an Islamic caliphate in France and 
the application of Shariah law. Outgoing 
President Sarkozy has insisted that the 
detentions and deportations are consistent 
with the law, and he explained the govern-
ment’s mission by stating, “All those who 
make remarks contrary to the value of the 
Republic will be instantly put outside the 
territory of the French Republic. There 
will be no exception, there will be no 
leniency.”
Anti-terrorism is an area of interna-
tional law that is unsettled, and over which 
there is considerable disagreement. On 
the one hand, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) provides that 
all persons receive the equal protection of 
the laws without distinction as to national 
origin or religion; that no one be subject 
to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile; that 
everyone have the right to an effective 
remedy by a competent national tribunal; 
that if charged with a crime, each person 
have the right to be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty according to law in a 
public trial; and that all individuals have 
the right to freedom of thought, con-
science, religion, opinion, expression, and 
association.
Yet, on the other hand, the United 
Nations Security Council and General 
Assembly have implemented a number 
of regulations allowing counter-terrorism 
measures to be taken by states individually 
and collectively. States, as sovereigns, may 
legitimately limit the exercise of certain 
rights, particularly freedom of movement 
and the right to privacy, when doing so 
protects public order and safety or national 
security. This broad and potentially limit-
less authority has led to the recognition 
of the risk of infringement on human 
rights through anti-terrorism measures. 
In response, the UN Counter-Terrorism 
Implementation Task Force has published 
a Basic Human Rights Reference Guide 
to the Stopping and Searching of Persons. 
Specifically, this instrument suggests that 
a decision to stop or search an indi-
vidual in an effort to counter terrorism 
must always be consistent with interna-
tional human rights law, be necessary 
to prevent terrorist acts or to apprehend 
those who participate in terrorist acts, and 
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not disproportionately or discriminatorily 
impact ordinary citizens.
A now well-settled theme in anti-ter-
rorism law is the general ambiguity and 
secretiveness surrounding state counter-
terrorism actions. As such, little informa-
tion has been released to the public regard-
ing France’s recent arrests and detentions. 
While the Toulouse tragedy certainly jus-
tifies a state’s action to prevent future 
occurrences of terrorism, the prompt and, 
in some cases, final nature of the govern-
ment’s arrest, detention, and deportation 
of dozens of suspected terrorists raises 
many questions regarding the protection 
of these individuals’ human rights. For 
instance, exactly how much evidence do 
French authorities have on these suspected 
terrorists? Is it merely coincidence that 
they acquired sufficient evidence to arrest 
thirteen individuals allegedly plotting to 
kidnap a prominent Jewish judge just 
after the Toulouse killings? Do authorities 
have more evidence against some of these 
suspected terrorists than websites, posted 
in exercise of their right to freedom of 
expression and opinion, and evidence of 
physical training sessions, in exercise of 
their right to freedom of assembly? Are 
these individuals receiving due process 
prior to deportation? Additionally, there 
are other concerns regarding the difficulty 
of identifying terrorists without making 
distinctions based solely on national origin 
or religion. As Frederic Pechenard, the 
Director of the French national police, put 
it: “There are hundreds of young French 
people who go to Egypt, to Yemen, to 
Pakistan, to study the Koran . . . who are 
nothing more than religious. Amid these 
hundreds of people are a few potential 
terrorists.”
Without more information regarding 
the arrests, one cannot justifiably make 
assertions as to whether the suspected ter-
rorists’ human rights are being respected. 
Even so, the arrests and deportations of 
dozens of suspected Islamic terrorists in 
response to the killings of one represent 
yet another example of a state bypassing 
the criminal justice system in favor of 
administrative measures that more easily 
enable denials of due process and equal 
protection of the law.
Kosovo’s Draft Criminal CoDe anD 
the risK to freeDom of the Press
The parliament of Kosovo is cur-
rently considering a new draft criminal 
code that has proven rather contentious 
with the Kosovo media and international 
human rights organizations. Two articles 
of the draft code, articles 37 and 38, may 
restrict freedoms of press and expression. 
Specifically, Article 37 of the proposed 
criminal code subjects journalists to possi-
ble criminal liability for publishing defam-
atory remarks in the media. This provision 
is new because the current criminal code 
does not contain a comparable counterpart. 
Article 38 of the proposed code, however, 
is similar to and modeled after article 29 
of the current criminal code. Article 29 
assigns criminal liability to those who 
“take part as [professionals] in the publica-
tion of media information,” who are mem-
bers of media editorial boards, and their 
assistants, when such individuals refuse to 
disclose their confidential sources, if the 
disclosure of such information is neces-
sary to prevent: an offense punishable by 
at least three years in prison, an offense 
of inducing another to expose their private 
parts or masturbate in public, the showing 
of pornography to minors under 16 years 
of age, misappropriation in office, and the 
accepting and giving of bribes.
The freedoms of press and expression 
are fundamental human rights recognized 
by the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Kosovo is a party to both the ICCPR and 
the ECHR, and is thereby bound by their 
provisions. Article 19 of the ICCPR lays 
out the right to freedom of expression 
to seek, receive, and impart information 
through any media of choice. This right, 
however, may be limited by law when 
necessary to respect the “rights and repu-
tations” of others, and to protect national 
security, “public order,” or “public health 
or morals.” Similarly, article 10 of the 
ECHR provides that everyone has the 
right to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public 
authority. This document, however, also 
includes exceptions to freedom of expres-
sion: this right may be subject to “restric-
tions or penalties when prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society, 
in the interests of national security, ter-
ritorial integrity, or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, [and] for 
the protection of the reputations or rights 
of others…”
After the National Assembly adopted 
the proposed code on April 20, 2012, the 
media community in Kosovo began a sus-
tained protest urging the President not to 
approve the code. On April 23, hundreds of 
journalists protested in silence before the 
National Assembly, and on May 3, Kosovo 
media outlets engaged in a one-day boycott 
when they refused to cover news regard-
ing the Kosovo government. After review-
ing the draft criminal code, Kosovo’s 
President, Atifete Jahjaga, returned the 
proposed code on May 8 to the National 
Assembly with instructions for revisions 
of the two contentious articles, stating the 
draft criminal code provisions were “con-
trary to Kosovo’s Constitution.”
While there has been much protest 
over the code’s proposed articles restrict-
ing freedoms of press and expression, it 
seems that the international legal docu-
ments protecting those freedoms allow for 
Kosovo’s proposed restrictions. Both the 
ICCPR and the ECHR provide for restric-
tions on freedom of expression that aim to 
protect the rights and reputations of others. 
Such provisions arguably make allowances 
for imposing criminal penalties on those 
who publish defamatory statements about 
others, as defamation tends to destroy the 
reputation of its target. Similarly, both the 
ICCPR and the ECHR provide for restric-
tions on the freedom of expression when 
necessary for the preservation of public 
order, health, morals, and national secu-
rity. These permissible restrictions could 
arguably justify a law imposing criminal 
liability on media members who refuse to 
reveal their confidential sources in cases 
involving any crime subject to a sentence 
of more than three years.
The proposed articles of Kosovo’s 
draft criminal code themselves may not 
violate international human rights law. 
Nevertheless, their implementation may 
be contrary to traditional notions of fun-
damental human rights and the freedoms 
associated with modern democratic societ-
ies. After all, such restrictions may provide 
cover and support for corruption and ille-
gal activity by discouraging the press from 
acting as the public watchdog and failing 
to protect whistle-blowers.
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Rachael Curtis, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers Europe for the Human 
Rights Brief.
South and Central aSia
Call for independent 
inveStigationS of politiCal 
diSappearanCeS in BangladeSh
On April 17, 2012, Elias Ali, secretary 
of the Sylhet Division of the opposition 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), dis-
appeared. Ali and his driver were both 
abducted that night, and Ali’s car and 
cell phone were found abandoned in a 
parking lot near his home in Dhaka. In 
response to Ali’s disappearance, Prime 
Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed said publi-
cally that she believes Ali and his driver 
are “hiding” at the behest of the BNP 
to allow opposition groups to blame the 
government. Ali’s wife, however, believes 
that security forces took him because of 
his involvement with the BNP. In reaction 
to the Prime Minister’s words, the BNP 
and allied groups announced a country-
wide strike on April 22nd. According to 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), Ali’s disap-
pearance is just one of a growing number 
of disappearances of government opposi-
tion leaders and activists. HRW called for 
Bangladesh to immediately order an inde-
pendent investigation of the growing num-
ber of politically related disappearances 
occurring throughout the country. In 2000, 
Bangladesh acceded to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), indicating a commitment 
to protecting the rights of individuals 
from enforced disappearances. By failing 
to investigate the increasing numbers of 
disappeared persons, Bangladesh is not 
fulfilling its responsibility to provide 
effective remedies, provided in Article 2 
of the ICCPR.
According to Odhikar and Ain-O-
Sailash, two Bangladeshi human rights 
organizations, there were only two enforced 
disappearances in 2009. In 2010, there were 
18 disappearances, and in 2011, 30 people 
were disappeared in Bangladesh. By May, 
22 people have already been disappeared 
in 2012. Human rights organizations in 
Dhaka accuse the Rapid Action Battalion 
(RAB), the Bangladeshi government’s 
military unit, of hundreds of extrajudicial 
killings and dozens of disappearances in 
the past year. RAB, which consists of 12 
battalions, was originally set up as an anti-
terrorism force in 2004. Five of the RAB 
battalions operate in Dhaka. According to 
Odhikar, RAB killed 732 people between 
RAB’s 2004 inception and March 2011. 
Extrajudicial killings escalated after the 
current Awami League government came 
to power in January 2009, but the RAB 
officially claims that each member of 
the opposition parties’ death occurred in 
crossfire and was in no way politically 
motivated. Although international and 
domestic human rights groups believe that 
the government is responsible for the vio-
lent suppression of opposition groups, 
the Bangladeshi government claims that 
political opposition disappearances have 
nothing to do with the RAB and are instead 
planned attempts to blame the government 
for violence.
Enforced disappearance, under Article 
2 of the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (ICCPED,) is “any form of 
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State 
or by persons or groups of persons acting 
with the authorization, support, or acquies-
cence of the state, followed by a refusal to 
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or 
by concealment of the fate or whereabouts 
of the disappeared person, which place 
such a person outside the protection of the 
law.” The ICCPED was adopted in 2010 
to prohibit states from employing forced 
disappearances and to hold states account-
able for the protection of citizens from 
enforced disappearances, which includes 
the duty to investigate disappearances 
even if they are not perpetuated by the 
state. Although Bangladesh claims that the 
RAB is not responsible for the pattern of 
enforced disappearances and extrajudicial 
killings throughout the country, ICCPED 
still requires that Bangladesh investigate 
the disappearances to determine the cause.
However, because Bangladesh is not 
a signatory to ICCPED, U.N. bodies can-
not apply the ICCPED directly. Instead, 
any action in response to Human Rights 
Watch’s demand for independent investi-
gation should come under the ICCPR, to 
which Bangladesh is a party. Under Article 
2 of the ICCPR, Bangladesh is obligated 
to provide effective remedy to those whose 
rights have been violated. According to 
the Human Rights Committee’s (HRC) 
General Comment 31, Bangladeshi author-
ities have a duty to investigate and to 
bring the perpetrators to justice under 
the ICCPR. General Comment 20 also 
specifies that “effective remedy” means 
that investigations of complaints must be 
prompt and impartial.
Because Bangladesh is not a signa-
tory to the First Optional Protocol, which 
would allow the Committee to hear indi-
vidual complaints of violations of the 
ICCPR, none of the individuals who have 
been affected can bring a claim against 
Bangladesh to the HRC. Another option is 
for human rights organizations in Dhaka 
and Human Rights Watch is to submit 
an NGO Country Report to the HRC. 
The HRC can then examine the NGO 
Report alongside Bangladesh’s Country 
Report and issue its recommendations to 
the Bangladeshi government to address 
the pattern of enforced disappearances 
throughout the country.
Megan Wakefield, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, covers South and Central 
Asia for the Human Rights Brief.
eaSt, SoutheaSt aSia & oCeania
indoneSia ratifieS the un Migrant 
WorkerS’ Convention
On April 13, 2012, Indonesia’s par-
liament unanimously ratified the 
International Convention on the Protection 
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families (Migrant 
Workers Convention). Lawmakers and 
civil society groups welcomed the entry 
into force of the treaty, which Indonesia 
had signed twelve years earlier but is 
only now legally binding. The Convention 
provides fundamental human rights protec-
tions for Indonesia’s approximately three 
million documented migrant workers cur-
rently overseas. However, only 45 coun-
tries have ratified the Convention. Absent 
harmonization with Indonesia’s domestic 
legal framework and reciprocity by receiv-
ing states, its impact on overseas workers 
may be slight in the short-term.
The rights articulated in the Migrant 
Workers Convention overlap with other 
major international human rights treaties 
and equalize migrant workers’ rights with 
those of citizens with employment status. 
Indonesian and international human rights 
advocates hope the Convention’s report-
ing requirements will act as a catalyst 
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for domestic reform. Under Article 73, 
Indonesia must submit a report within 
one year to a Committee outlining its 
legislative, judicial, administrative, and 
other efforts taken to comply with the 
Convention’s provisions. The substantive 
provisions applicable to Indonesia as a 
state of origin include Article 37, which 
obligates the government to inform work-
ers of their rights and obligations under 
the local law of their destination country 
before departure. Article 37 further speci-
fies that state parties must freely provide 
this information in an appropriate lan-
guage. Under Article 65, parties must also 
maintain services to provide information 
and assistance regarding travel authoriza-
tions, living conditions, and any relevant 
local labor regulations.
The Convention’s provisions mandating 
state delivery of important pre-departure 
services could provide the catalyst to trans-
form Indonesia’s much-criticized National 
Law on the Placement and Protection 
of Indonesian Overseas Workers (Law 
39/2004). Currently, Law 39/2004 del-
egates extensive responsibility to private 
recruitment agencies in facilitating over-
seas work placements without sufficient 
regulation. These agencies register work-
ers with the Ministry of Manpower and 
Transmigration, arrange employer con-
tracts, and conduct pre-departure train-
ings. The law, however, does not compel 
specific government action to effectively 
investigate and monitor these practices. 
Workers are sometimes fraudulently forced 
to pay excessive costs for travel documents 
once in the capital for pre-departure orien-
tation, the quality of which is unregulated. 
The vague provisions of Law 39/2004 at 
once involve 13 government agencies in 
oversight but create fatal jurisdictional 
challenges; regional governments are pow-
erless to sanction or withdraw agency per-
mits on their own. This failure to clearly 
delineate duties means that all government 
stakeholders are able to eschew responsi-
bility. The result has been a lack of aware-
ness and inability to address illegal recruit-
ment practices at the local level.
Even under a revised Law 39/2004, 
Indonesian migrant workers will con-
tinue to face numerous challenges as they 
travel to states that are not a party to 
the Convention. Neither Saudi Arabia nor 
Malaysia is a party, which together receive 
nearly 80% of Indonesia’s workers. Last 
year saw 1,075 worker deaths in both 
countries according an Indonesian human 
rights group. A moratorium on sending 
workers to Saudi Arabia has been in place 
since August 2011, but recruitment agen-
cies nevertheless have defied this ban. 
Twenty-five maids remain on death row 
there, and the remains of another, cause of 
death unknown, were returned to Indonesia 
in the week preceding adoption of the 
Convention. Malaysia is once more a des-
tination country following the adoption of 
a 2011 Memorandum of Understanding, 
which now allows workers to keep their 
passports and enjoy one day of rest each 
week. Still, the agreement does not address 
minimum wage concerns or contribute to 
the regulation of illegal recruitment prac-
tices. Indonesia’s Minister of Manpower 
and Transmigration has pledged not to send 
workers anywhere that does not respect 
the Convention. However, countries like 
Malaysia can and have in the past easily 
replaced Indonesian labor with migrant 
workers from Cambodia. Indonesia is 
therefore forced to juggle competing inter-
ests to sustain this crucial component of 
its economy, which saw USD $8 billion in 
remittances in 2011.
Indonesia’s ratification of the 
Convention is a significant first step to pre-
serving migrant workers’ rights. Yet much 
work is still needed to realize what Foreign 
Minister Marty Natelegawa describes as 
a breakthrough towards better protection 
mechanisms. Indonesia’s regulatory frame-
work needs revisions to provide better 
oversight of recruitment agencies, and this 
resolve should also be reflected in the gov-
ernment’s bilateral agreements. Perhaps 
most importantly, widespread acceptance 
of norms enshrined in the Convention is 
necessary to fully realize its protections. 
Otherwise, progress will continue in incre-
mental steps by labor supply countries 
like Indonesia, which can only achieve 
partial success towards protecting migrant 
workers’ rights absent cooperation by the 
international community.
Wukan Holds local ElEctions, 
displays civil disobEdiEncE
In March 2012, a small fishing vil-
lage of 10,000 residents in southern 
Guangdong province elected Lin Zuluan as 
its leader. Nearly 80% of Wukan residents 
cast ballots in what was seen as a shock-
ing concession from local Communist 
Party authorities. The election followed 
a lengthy standoff between farmers and 
the local government, which had trans-
ferred the village’s remaining farmland to 
developers for industrial use. After initial 
violence in the fall protesting confiscation 
of their land without adequate compensa-
tion, the Chinese government’s reaction 
has been surprisingly tolerant. Despite 
continued targeting of dissident lawyers, 
Tibetan monks, and high-level politicians, 
Wukan has emerged as an anomalous and 
successful instance of civil disobedience.
Protests in Wukan came to a head in 
December 2011 after Xue Jingbo, a leader 
of the movement, was abducted and died 
in police custody. Xue Jingbo had been 
detained for his role in the first rallies held 
in September when a violent clash between 
villagers and police occurred. Authorities 
said he had died of a heart attack, while 
family members said his body showed 
multiple signs of physical abuse. Nearly 
1,000 villagers gathered in outrage and 
refused to retreat, shouting slogans like, 
“Down with corrupt officials.” Shortly 
thereafter, senior provincial Communist 
Party officials met with village leaders 
and promised to release other protestors 
in police custody. They also agreed to 
recognize a democratically elected vil-
lage governing committee, the local body 
controlling finances and land sales. This 
committee, now comprised of residents 
with no prior government experience, is 
seeking return of the land sold by previous 
authorities. Provincial Communist Party 
Vice Secretary Zhu Mingguo recently vis-
ited Wukan and promised that a portion 
would be returned by May 1, 2012.
These recent developments have left 
Wukan residents hopeful and also fueled 
speculation about the village as a model 
for grassroots democracy in China. Critics 
waiver on their effectiveness, but direct 
elections have been occurring at the vil-
lage level in China since the draft version 
of the Organic Law of Village Committees 
was piloted in 1987. The National People’s 
Congress fully adopted the law in 1998, 
which allows for direct election of three to 
seven village committee members by eli-
gible voters over the age of 18. This prin-
ciple of self-governance is also found in 
the Constitution of the People’s Republic 
of China. Article 111 states that “[t]he 
chairman, vice-chairmen and members of 
each residents’ or villagers’ committee 
are elected by the residents.” As is the 
case at other levels of Chinese govern-
ment, some provinces hold only indirect 
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elections by permitting voting on candi-
dates nominated by village communist 
party branches. However, in other prov-
inces, committee members are nominated 
directly by villagers, by groups within the 
village or in numerical groups reaching a 
certain threshold.
The Organic Law of Village Committees 
has led to several important developments. 
First, provincial level governments have 
promulgated local laws on the imple-
mentation of vague provisions within the 
national law. Thus, the national law has 
given birth to a variety of experimentation 
at the local level, which in some cases 
has led to legitimate systems of direct 
representation. In Lishu county in Jilin 
province, implementation rules explicitly 
forbid nomination of candidates by the 
Communist Party. Villages like Xinfeng 
in Jilin province have also prevailed in 
holding direct elections this past March. 
In this way, democratically elected vil-
lage committees have sprouted through-
out China and are exercising leadership 
alongside village Party branches. Their 
co-existence has contributed to what some 
observers describe as changes towards 
more inclusive, democratic leadership 
styles. Most importantly, the national law 
has created a legal infrastructure for self-
governance at the grassroots level.
Wukan villagers described the March 
2012 election as the first real poll in 
years. Contrastingly, the Secretary of the 
Guangdong Provincial Committee of the 
Communist Party denied the election 
represented any significant departure in 
governance. Secretary Wang Yang main-
tained that, “What made the Wukan elec-
tion special was that the organic law and 
election rules were fully observed and 
implemented in detail this time, unlike 
previous pro forma elections.” By admit-
ting past corruption, Wang Yang shrewdly 
framed the Party’s response to the Wukan 
protests as an admirable resort to the rule 
of law. “That’s why we decided to stand 
on the side of the villagers instead of a 
few local village officials,” said Wang 
Yang, who is also competing for a spot 
in China’s Politburo Standing Committee. 
The Wukan phenomenon is therefore not 
an innovative model for democracy, but 
instead is an example of deft political han-
dling of local unrest prior to Party leader-
ship elections next year.
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